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ENCOURAGING FURTHER INNOVATION:  






In 1790, Congress passed the first American patent statute, 
which contained a written description requirement for all patents.
1
  
The Patent Act was subsequently amended,
2
 yet the written 
 
 * J.D. 2012, cum laude, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005, The 
University of Maryland, College Park.  I would like to thank Professor David 
Opderbeck and Professor Jordan Paradise for their continuing support, advice, and 
supervision and to Brigitte Radigan for her comments and assistance.  
 1 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, §§ 1–7, 1 Stat. 109.  see infra note 15; Janice C. 
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological 
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 618 (1998); see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  The Act stated: 
The grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the time of granting 
the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing, 
containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, [if 
necessary,] of the thing or things, by him or them invented or 
discovered, and described as aforesaid, in said patents; which 
specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not 
only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before 
known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled 
in the art . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the 
public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the 
patent term. 
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. at 110–11 (emphasis added).  The second part 
of the statute following “but also” articulates a separate “enablement requirement.”  
Id. 
 2 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22 (“Every inventor, before he 
can receive a patent shall . . . deliver a written description of his invention, and of the 
manner of using, or process of compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact 
terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable 
any person skilled in the art or science of which it is a branch, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same.”); Patent Act of 1836, 
ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (“[H]e shall deliver a written description of his 
invention or discover, and of the manner and process of making, constructing, using, 
and compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms, avoiding 
unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it 
appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, 
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description requirement is still included in the most up-to-date 
patent law statute.
3
  Existing in nearly the same form for over 200 
years, the written description requirement is an essential element to 
patent law.  Recently, however, the purpose and scope of this 
foundational patent requirement has become a subject of heated 
debate within the patent law community.
4
  Highlighted by the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (CAFC) controversial decision in 
the 2010 case Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
5
 much of the 
debate focuses on the CAFC’s recent application of the written 
description requirement to emerging biotechnology inventions,
6
 and, 
as a result, on the potential impact on biotechnology innovation and 




and use the same.”); Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201; Patent Act of 
1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 752. 
 3 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description 
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .”). 
 4 See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361–67 (Radar, J., dissenting); Anascape, Ltd., v. 
Nintendo of America, Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Gajarsa, J., 
concurring); Brief for Amgen, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5–7, 
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV-
11280); Brief for Microsoft Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2–4, 
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV-
11280); Brief for Regents of the University of California et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 8–10, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV-11280)[hereinafter Regents Amicus Brief]; Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1–2, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV-11280); Chris Holman, 
Ariad v. Eli Lilly: Pragmatism Prevails over Coherent Patent Doctrine, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH 
IP BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010, 11:17 A.M.), 
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/ariad-v-eli-lilly-pragmatism-
prevails.html. 
 5 Ariad, 598 F.3d 1336 (majority opinion). 
 6 See, e.g., Alison E. Cantor, Using the Written Description and Enablement 
Requirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 267 (2000). 
 7 See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1359 (Newman, J., concurring); Regents Amicus Brief, supra 
note 4, at 9–10; Warren Woessner, Ariad v. Lilly Comes Down (On Us)—Judge Lourie 
Rules!, PATENTS4LIFE BLOG (March 23, 2010), 
http://www.patents4life.com/2010/03/ariad-v-lilly-comes-down-on-us-%E2%80%93-
judge-lourie-rules/.  See generally Cantor, supra note 6 (discussing how the trend of 
using the written description and enablement requirements to limit biotechnology 
patents in particular); David Kelly, The Federal Circuit Transforms the Written Description 
into a Biotech-Specific Hurdle to Obtaining Patent Protection for Biotechnology Patents, 13 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 249 (2002) (discussing how the current application of the 
written description requirement could create special standards for the biotechnology 
industry and how this could negatively impact biotechnology innovation); Shraddha 
A. Upadhyaya, The Postmodern Written Description Requirement: An Analysis of the 
Application of the Heightened Written Description Requirement to Original Claims, 4 MINN. 
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The Ariad case was brought by, among others, Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(collectively, “Ariad”), who alleged infringement of their patent by Eli 
Lilly & Company (“Lilly”).
8
  Ariad’s invention was a method that 
stopped a specific protein from binding to human cells in harmful 
amounts.
9
  The court invalidated a number of Ariad’s claims under 
the written description requirement because Ariad, while describing 
a useful method, failed to describe a specific agent that could 
accomplish the claimed method.
10
  Essentially, Ariad did not possess 
every invention it claimed on the day it filed for a patent.
11
  
Contesting the court’s use of the written description requirement, 
Ariad argued that the requirement is satisfied as long as an inventor 
merely identifies his invention and through this identification 




Analyzing the current written description statute, 35 U.S.C. § 
112,
13
 the court affirmed the long-held notion that the first paragraph 
of § 112 included two separate patent requirements: the written 
 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 65 (2002) (discussing how the current application of the written 
description requirement departs from precedent, and how this uncertainty might 
pose problems for the future of biotechnology innovation). 
 8 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340.  Other parties include the Whitehead Institute for 
Biomedical Research and Harvard University.  Id. at 1336. 
 9 Id. at 1341. 
 10 Id. at 1352–53.  In fact, through the collaborative work of the plaintiffs, the NF-
[K]B protein was discovered in the mid-1980s.  Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
529 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D. Mass. 2007).  During the prosecution of their initial 
claims, the plaintiffs were consistently rejected by the Patent Office because they 
failed to describe all necessary “agents” that would have the desired result of 
inhibiting NF-[K]B.  Id. at 112–13.  The primary reason for rejection was the 
plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112.  Id.  The broad 
claims that the Patent Office eventually approved removed the description of any 
“agent.”  Id. at 113.  After the Ariad decision, it seems that it would have been equally 
appropriate to invalidate the original claims under the written description 
requirement for failure to adequately show possession of the plaintiffs’ claimed 
genus.  See infra notes 234–48 and accompanying text.  
 11 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. 
 12 Id. at 1342, 1344. 
 13 The written description statute states: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by 
the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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description requirement and the enablement requirement.
14
  To 
satisfy the enablement requirement, a patent applicant must, through 
the patent specification, “teach those [of ordinary skill] in the art to 
make and use the invention without undue experimentation.”
15
  To 
satisfy the written description requirement, a patent applicant must, 
through the patent specification, allow a person of ordinary skill in 
the art to see that the inventor has “possession” of the claimed 
invention.
16
  These two requirements have always been intertwined in 
the same paragraph of the patent statute.
17
  They both encourage full 
disclosure of a patentee’s invention in exchange for the exclusive 
rights granted by a patent.
18
  The enablement requirement, however, 
might be satisfied if an inventor, aware of a general result, structures 
his claims to include a broad range of inventions that he may or may 
not have possessed at the time he filed for a patent.
19
  Rapid advances 
and shifting norms in a particular field allow an inventor to anticipate 
changes and make claims based on mere speculation, which makes 
any inquiry into what the inventor intended to teach confusing and 
unclear.  The written description requirement avoids this pitfall by 
simply establishing—based on specific examples in the 
specification—whether or not the inventor actually possessed the full 
scope of his claimed invention at the time of filing. 
Ariad’s application of the written description requirement not 
only fits into the patent system as a whole, but also conforms to 
Congress’s overall policy goals over the last thirty years with regard to 
biotechnology innovation.
20
 The current patent system is a result of 
 
 14 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344 (“We . . . hold that § 112, first paragraph, contains two 
separate description requirements: a “written description [i] of the invention and [ii] 
of the manner and process of making and using [the invention].” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 15 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); 
Cantor, supra note 6, at 283.  The enablement requirement is also found in the 1790 
patent statute alongside the written description requirement.  See sources cited supra 
note 2.  A patent is enabled as long as a person of ordinary skill in the art can make 
and use the invention.  See Mueller, supra note 1, at 622. 
 16 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. 
 17 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 18 See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Cantor, 
supra note 6, at 268. 
 19 See infra Part II.D. 
 20 Recent publications provide additional insight into the written description 
requirement’s place in the overall goals of the patent system, and how Ariad 
maintains the “quid pro quo” of the patent system to reward exclusive rights for 
adequate and appropriate disclosure of an invention.  See, e.g., Jacob Adam 
Schroeder, Written Description: Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Since 1973, 21 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 63 (2010).  In his article, Professor Schroeder details 
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the constitutional mandate for Congress to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”
21
  The system provides a monetary incentive 
to inventors by granting them exclusive rights to their inventions.
22
  
To earn these rights, an inventor must satisfy a number of 
requirements, including written description.
23
  To that end, the 
patent system ensures that an inventor has a legitimate right to his 
claimed invention (i.e., that he actually invented it) and provides 
members of the public with notice of the invention so that they may 
use the inventor’s knowledge for further innovation.
24
  Using these 
general goals as a backdrop, Congress has targeted the biotechnology 
industry by providing further incentives designed to fuel 
biotechnology innovation.  The Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts 
signify two major efforts by Congress to stimulate U.S. biotechnology 
innovation: the former by providing patent protection to entities that 
perform the majority of the country’s biotechnology research,
25
 and 
the latter by, among other things, providing an experimental use 





the primary stances of the current Federal Circuit judges with regard to the scope 
and purpose of the written description requirement.  Id. at 84–89.  The article also 
includes a look at how the requirement has been applied at different times over the 
last 200 years.  Id. at 72–84.  But see Krista Stone, Written Description After Ariad v. Eli 
Lilly: 35 U.S.C. § 112’s Third Wheel, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 191 (2011) (arguing that the 
CAFC in Ariad problematically upset the settled expectations of inventors, 
particularly those in the biotechnology, and, by focusing on the written description 
requirement, missed an opportunity to strengthen enablement case law). 
 21 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 22 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1576–80, 1676 (2003); Cantor, supra note 6, at 285–87. 
 23 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–376 (2006).  Specifically, among other requirements, a patent 
applicant’s claimed invention must be patentable subject matter, be novel, not be 
obvious in light of a prior invention, id. §§ 101–103, include the best mode for 
carrying out the invention, and must include claims that “particularly [point] out 
and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.”  Id. § 112.  See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (discussing 
patentable subject matter); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 
(discussing nonobviousness); Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (discussing requirements for distinctly pointing out the claimed subject 
matter); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2006). 
 24 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1576. 
 25 See 32 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006); see also infra notes 151–83 and accompanying 
text. 
 26 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006); see also Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennet, Bayh-Dole: If 
We Knew then What We Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 320–23 (2006); 
Elizabeth Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities 
Deserve Special Treatment?, 59 ME. L. REV. 283, 295–98 (2007). 
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Ariad’s application of the written description requirement is 
particularly appropriate in the complex and unpredictable field of 
biotechnology where the true scope of a claimed invention may be 
unclear.
27
  Such was the case in Ariad where the inventors attempted 
to claim a broad invention that they did not actually possess.  If courts 
erroneously grant broad exclusive rights to those who do not actually 
possess the claimed invention, further innovation can be stifled as 
other researchers may not be able to further the inventive process.
28
  
For a complex and ever-changing field like biotechnology, the written 
description requirement provides a useful and straightforward tool 
for courts in determining what invention an inventor actually 
possessed at the time he filed his claim, avoiding the alternative of an 
in-depth inquiry into the overall nature of technology over the years. 
Some argue, however, that the written description requirement 
as applied in Ariad and its predecessors
29
 unfairly targets 
biotechnology patents by demanding too much specificity from 
inventors who work on groundbreaking basic research.
30
  The fear is 
that the pioneers of a technology, specifically those at the university 
level, will lose their ability to gain patents over their discoveries as 
other entities pick up on basic discoveries and turn those into 
finalized products.
31
  Further, some scholars argue that Ariad 
represents a deviation from prior written description jurisprudence, 
leading some to believe that the CAFC’s interpretation of the 
requirement is inaccurate and improper.
32
  These scholars fear that 
Ariad’s interpretation of the written description requirement will 
negate the incentives for those performing the basic research that 
fuels biotechnology innovation, thus impacting negatively the future 
of U.S. biotechnology research as a whole.
33
 
Despite these fears, the written description requirement, as 
applied in Ariad, is unlikely to put an end to the current successes of 
the biotechnology industry.  In fact, it is likely that the CAFC’s use of 
the requirement in Ariad will have a positive impact on overall 
 
 27 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1676; Cantor, supra note 6, at 287. 
 28 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1676–78. 
 29 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1997); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 30 See Kelly, supra note 7, at 266 (noting that the written description rewards those 
who can sequence DNA the fastest and not those who made a breakthrough 
discovery in the first place); Upadhyaya, supra note 6, at 110. 
 31 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 7, at 267–68. 
 32 See Kelly, supra note 7, at 270; Upadhyaya, supra note 8, at 110. 
 33 Kelly, supra note 7, at 270 (discussing Lilly, a predecessor to Ariad). 
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biotechnology growth and innovation.
34
  By applying a simpler and 
more straightforward analysis, courts can more easily identify 
overbroad claims that the Patent Office should not have granted.  
Further, a strong written description requirement encourages patent 
applicants to provide the public with a more detailed description of 
their invention, helps police overbroad claims, and ensures that 
inventors complete their inventions before they are awarded a 
patent.
35
  Through the written description requirement, the system 
can appropriately reward those who have legitimate rights to their 
inventions by providing additional confidence to those willing to 
commit to the long-term investment that is required to develop many 
biotechnology products. 
This Comment argues that Ariad, through the enforcement of 
the written description requirement, illustrates how the CAFC is 
promoting biotechnology innovation.  Ariad demonstrates that the 
written description requirement is an important tool that furthers the 
congressional policies of the Bayh-Dole Act, Hatch-Waxman Act, and 
the U.S. patent system in general.  Part II outlines the general U.S. 
patent requirements, focusing specifically on the history of the 
written description requirement, which dates back to the first Patent 
Act of 1790.  Part II shows, through historical and modern case law, 
how courts have applied the requirement and why the Ariad decision 
upholds the traditional purpose of the requirement.  Part III 
discusses the general nature of the biotechnology industry, with 
particular focus on the Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts and the 
overall policies that the U.S. patent system seeks to promote in the 
industry.  Part IV discusses the Ariad decision in detail, looking at 
both the CAFC’s analysis supporting its interpretation of the written 
description requirement and its ultimate holding with regard to this 
requirement.  Finally, Part V explains how the Ariad decision and the 
CAFC’s interpretation of the written description requirement are 
positive steps towards fixing the current innovation problems in the 
biotechnology industry and how the decision furthers the overall 
goals of the patent system.  Specifically, Part V argues that the 
decision balances the competing interests in the biotechnology 
industry and encourages innovation through industry-university 
 
 34 See discussion infra Part V. 
 35 See discussion infra Part V; see also Patrick Brian Giles, How to Claim a Gene: 
Application of the Patent Disclosure Requirements to Genetic Sequences, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
695 (2011) (discussing the separate enablement and written description 
requirements, how they impact the scope of genetic sequence patents, and a 
potential method for adequately disclosing genetic sequence genus claims). 
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cooperation, thereby promoting the congressional intent of the Bayh-
Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts.  Part VI concludes. 
II. OVERVIEW OF PATENT REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY U.S.C. 
TITLE 35 
A.  General Patent Characteristics 
The patent system as a whole is designed to promote progress 
and innovation by granting inventors exclusive rights to their 
inventions.
36
  The monetary incentive of exclusive rights to an 
invention encourages inventors to constantly innovate.
37
  The system 
then benefits the general public, as inventors are pushed to create 
beneficial technologies that, without any encouragement, they might 
not have otherwise invented.
38
  Before rewarding an inventor, 
however, the system must ensure that the invention actually 
contributes to the arts.  To that end, Congress enacted a series of 
requirements that must be satisfied in order to determine if an 






  To 
warrant the issuance of a patent, an invention must provide some 
benefit to society and must not be a merely generalized idea, a 
technology that is already in existence, or an obvious improvement 
on existing technology.
42
   
While an invention’s value to society lies in its ability to 
contribute to the useful arts, to an inventor, a patent is only as 
valuable as its overall scope and duration.
43
  If the scope of an 
inventor’s patent is narrow, other inventors can simply design around 
the original invention once it is disclosed to the public.
44
  Further, 
under the current system, a patent generally lasts for only twenty 
years from the inventor’s filing date.
45
  Given the delays that could 
occur between a patent’s filing date and the date on which the 
 
 36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1580. 
 37 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1580. 
 38 Id. 
 39 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 40 Id. § 102. 
 41 Id. § 103 (2006); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (“The claimed subject matter must be useful, novel, and 
not obvious.”); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990). 
 42 See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 1.01, 3.01, 4.01, 5.01 (2010).   
 43 See Cantor, supra note 6, at 270; Merges & Nelson, supra note 41, at 840. 
 44 Cantor, supra note 6, at 270. 
 45 35 U.S.C. § 154(2) (2006). 
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product is released on the market, an inventor’s exclusivity period 
may end up being significantly shorter than that to which he is 
entitled under the patent system.
46
  In order to provide a sufficient 
incentive for inventors to continue to innovate, the value of a patent 




Just as patents that are too narrow provide too little 
compensation for inventors, patents that are too broad may provide 
too much.
48
  It is important that a patent only include an inventor’s 
actual contribution to the useful arts so that future inventors can be 
rewarded for their own contributions.  In addition, progress is only 
attainable if an inventor discloses the full scope of his invention so 
that others can gain the full benefit of the inventor’s discovery; this 
disclosure also allows others to avoid infringing on the inventor’s 
exclusive rights.
49
  It is in this regard that the written description fits 
into the patent system.  Every patent applicant must provide a full 
and detailed description of his invention to prove that he not only 
possesses the claimed invention but also that he can teach others how 
to make and use the invention.
50
  Simply put, the patent system 
assumes that if an inventor actually invented what he claims, he 
should have little difficulty describing it in detail to others of equal 
skill and teaching them how to accomplish the same task; if he 
cannot, it is unlikely that he actually invented what he is claiming. 
Finally, because an inventor is awarded exclusivity from the date 
he files for a patent, the inventor must satisfy the descriptive 
requirements as of that date.
51
  Generally, an inventor cannot 
subsequently expand his claimed invention once he has applied to 
 
 46 Biotechnology products in particular have long delays between the date on 
which patent applications are filed and the date on which the products hit the 
market.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1683.  These delays are the result of high 
levels of regulatory scrutiny.  Id.  Specifically, it is estimated that new drugs released 
in the mid-90s averaged a mere twelve years of exclusivity by the time they were 
introduced to the market.  Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New 
Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849, 852–53 (2002). 
 47 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 41, at 868–69. 
 48 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1584. 
 49 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 
(2002). 
 50 See id. at 736 (“[The] patent application must describe, enable, and set forth 
the best mode of carrying out the invention.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006))). 
 51 See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Glass, 
492 F.2d 1228, 1231–32 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
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obtain his exclusive rights.
52
  Once an invention has been disclosed to 
the Patent Office or the public, that invention becomes a part of the 
useful arts.
53
  Accordingly, an inventor attempting to expand upon his 
earlier disclosure may no longer be awarded exclusive rights to his 




Overall, each separate requirement for a patent must further the 
goal of promoting progress in the useful arts.  This was the goal of 
the first Patent Act and continues to be the goal today.
55
  As the Ariad 
case demonstrates, the written description requirement is essential to 
promoting that goal.
56
  As the court explained, courts have used the 
requirement since its creation to ensure that an inventor actually 
invented what he originally claimed, while also encouraging inventors 
to fully describe their invention so that others could use that 
knowledge to innovate.
57
  The requirement maintains the “quid pro 
quo in which the public is given meaningful disclosure in exchange 
for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period 
of time.”
58
  This is as true today in Ariad as it was when the original 
Patent Act was passed in 1790. 
B. History of Written Description 
The written description requirement for patents issued in the 
United States is found under 35 U.S.C. § 112, which states, “The 
specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention . . . .”
59
  Since the original Patent Act of 1790, the written 
description requirement has been used to provide the public with 
notice of the scope of an inventor’s “exclusive rights” (i.e., the patent 
that an inventor is claiming).
60
  Through a written description, an 
inventor both shows that his invention is in fact an invention—
 
 52 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d 1555.  A patent may, at times, be expanded upon a reissue.  
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251–255 (2006). 
 53 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 112 (2006); Merges & Nelson, supra note 41, at 844–
45. 
 54 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d 1555. 
 55 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, §§ 1–7, 1 Stat. 109 (“An Act to promote the progress 
of Useful Arts.”). 
 56 See discussion infra Part V.   
 57 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 58 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Schroeder, supra note 20, at 104. 
 59 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344. 
 60 See Mueller, supra note 1, at 619–20. 
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describing how the invention is different from anything already 
known—and puts the public ‘“in possession’ of the boundaries of a 




The Supreme Court provided an interpretation of the written 
description requirement in 1822 in Evans v. Eaton.
62
  The primary 
issue in Evans was whether the defendant infringed on the plaintiff’s 
patent for an improved “hopperboy.”
63
  The plaintiff claimed as his 
invention “the peculiar properties or principles which this machine 
possesses, in the spreading, turning, and gathering the meal at one 
operation, and the rising and lowering of its arms by its motion, to 
accommodate itself to any quantity of meal it has to operate upon.”
64
  
In his claim, the plaintiff did not disclose “any distinct 
improvement.”
65
  Even if the plaintiff had in fact created a patentable 
invention, the Court invalidated the patent for failure to satisfy the 
written description requirement.
66
  The Court explained the purpose 
of the written description requirement: 
[To] put the public in possession of what the party claims as his 
own invention, so as to ascertain if he claims anything that is in 
common use, or is already known, and to guard against prejudice 
or injury from the use of an invention which the party may 
otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented.67 
The Court also noted that the written description was necessary to 
prevent patentees from claiming patents “broader than [their] 
invention.”
68
  The Evans case continues to be an important guideline 
for modern application the written description requirement.
69
 
The Evans interpretation is still relevant because the language of 
the written description requirement has remained essentially the 
same since the first Patent Act in 1790 even though the current 
language more closely resembles the language in the Patent Act of 
 
 61 Id. at 619 (quoting Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822)). 
 62 Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356. 
 63 Id. at 424.  The “hopperboy” was a “mechanical device used to stir and cool 
flour prior to its packing.”  Mueller, supra note 1, at 618–19 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 64 Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 428. 
 65 Id. at 433. 
 66 Id. at 435. 
 67 Id. at 434. 
 68 Id. at 430. 
 69 See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(citing Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 433–34). 
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1836.
70
  Although the initial purpose of the written description 
requirement seems relatively straightforward, the Patent Act of 1870 
seemed to diminish the role of the written description.
71
  The 1870 
Act added the statutory requirement for the modern “claims.”
72
  
While the written description language still remains, its purpose of 
specifically describing the scope of the invention can appear 
redundant in light of the newly enacted requirement to “particularly 
point out and distinctly claim” the invention.
73
  Despite this apparent 
redundancy, the written description requirement still serves its 
purpose of rejecting inadequate original claims and also invalidating 




The written description requirement applies to an inventor’s 
claimed invention on the date that the inventor files the application 
for a patent.
75
  The inventor’s initial patent application must allow a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to know that the inventor has 
“possession” of his claimed invention on the day he files his patent 
application.
76
  This original written description becomes the basis for 
subsequent amendments or alterations to the original patent 
application.
77
  An inventor may amend his originally claimed patent 
 
 70 See Upadhyaya, supra note 7, at 69 n.34 (quoting In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593 
(C.C.P.A. 1977); see also Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (stating that an 
inventor “shall deliver a written description of his invention or discover, and of the 
manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same”). 
 71 See Mueller, supra note 1, at 620. 
 72 See id.; see also Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, §26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (noting that 
before an inventor may receive a patent he must “particularly point out and distinctly 
claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or 
discovery; and said specification and claim shall be signed by the inventor”) (emphasis 
added); Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996) (“Claim 
practice did not achieve statutory recognition until the passage of the Act of 1836 . . . 
and . . . did not become a statutory requirement until 1870.”).  The statute notes 
both a specification and a claim in the margin.  Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 
Stat. 198, 201.  The previous Act of 1836 noted: “[A]nd in the case of any machine 
[the inventor] shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or 
combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.”  Patent Act of 1836, 
ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119.  The statute only notes specification in the margin.  Id. 
 73 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201; see also Mueller, supra note 
1, at 620. 
 74 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed Cir. 1991); see also 
Cantor, supra note 6, at 296–97; Upadhyaya, supra note 7, at 71. 
 75 See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64; Cantor, supra note 6, at 296. 
 76 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822). 
 77 See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d 1555; Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 601 
F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 251 (2006); Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 22, at 1652–53. 
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in a couple of different ways.  For one, after a patentee files an 
application for a patent, he may subsequently amend his patent 
through a continuation application.
78
  The continuation, however, 
may not include new matter that was not found in the original written 
description.
79
  Additionally, an inventor can surrender and amend a 
“defective” patent if the inventor inadvertently, through the 
specification, claimed more or less than he had a right to patent or 
made an error in his specification.
80
  The amendment, or “reissue,” 
may broaden the scope of a patent as long as it is within two years of 
the issuance of the initial patent.
81
  The reissue, however, may not 
introduce new matter to the application for reissue.
82
  Accordingly, 
the scope of the original patent application—the written 
description—is essential to inventors seeking to clarify their original 
claims. 
In recent years, the CAFC has used the written description 
requirement to police abuse of the amendment process and to 
determine whether to award priority to an earlier invention date over 
subsequent amendments.
83
  The seminal case in which the CAFC 
applied the written description requirement to subsequent patent 
applications is Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar.
84
  In Vas-Cath, the inventor 
initially filed a “design application” disclosing a drawing of his 
invention, which was included in a subsequent filing that provided a 
more detailed description of the initial drawing.
85
  The court held 
that the written description requirement is satisfied if the original 
application “convey[s] with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the 
art” that the inventor “was in possession of the invention,” the 
invention being “whatever is now claimed.”
86
  While this description 
does not have to be exact, it should not be so broad as to cover 
 
 78 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2011).  An inventor who is 
successfully granted a continuation may claim the original filing date of his invention 
as his invention date.  35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006). 
 79 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006); see also Gentry Gallery Inc., v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 
1473, 1479–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a 
Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the 
Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 6 (2007). 
 80 Id. § 251.  The error cannot be purposeful or deceptive.  Id.; see also Cantor, 
supra note 6, at 296. 
 81 § 251. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 1558–59. 
 86 Id. at 1563–64. 
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inventions the inventor did not in fact invent.
87
  While Vas-Cath 
focused on subsequent amendments to a claim, the Supreme Court 
has noted that a claim can still be invalid if the inventor cannot show 
he possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing.
88
 
The Supreme Court highlighted the limits of a broad patent 
claim in the pre-1870 case O’Reilly v. Morse.
89
  Morse, the pioneer of 
the telegraph, the invention at issue in the case, attempted to extend 
his claim to include every possible improvement that used electric or 
galvanic current in a similar fashion to his telegraph system.
90
  
Specifically, in his eighth claim, Morse boldly stated: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts 
of machinery, described in the foregoing specifications and 
claims; the essence of my invention being the use of the motive 
power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-
magnetism, however developed, for making or printing 
intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a 




The Court made it clear that while Morse discovered an 
incredibly useful and novel invention, he had not discovered that the 
electric or galvanic current would always have the exact same effect 
no matter what machinery was used.
92
  Specific and complex 
machinery were required to produce the effect that Morse was 
claiming.
93
  Morse had thus not invented or “discovered” additional 
uses of electric or galvanic current beyond the method and 
machinery described in his claim.
94
  The Court made it clear that 
allowing such a broad patent would stifle further discoveries that 
were certainly not part of Morse’s original claim.
95
  The Court further 
explained that if it allowed the eighth claim, no specification would 
be needed beyond a statement that by using X (electro-magnetism), 




 87 Id. at 1563. 
 88 See supra text accompanying notes 62–69 & infra text accompanying notes 89–
96. 
 89 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
 90 Id. at 112. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 117. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113. 
 96 Id. at 119. 
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In 1967, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the 
predecessor to the CAFC, reaffirmed the use of the written 
description requirement to invalidate original claims.
97
  The case, In 
re Ruschig, dealt with the sole issue of whether the patent applicant’s 
claim was “supported by the disclosure of [applicant’s] application.”
98
  
In his claims, the patent applicant disclosed a number of different 
chemical reagents.
99
  The applicant then attempted to claim that he 
had disclosed a particular chemical compound, chlorpropamide.
100
  
The applicant believed that he was entitled to claim chlorpropamide 
because the compound could be created through a combination of 
three of the reagents listed in the claim and because he had disclosed 
a number of specific compounds that the reagents could create.
101
  
The judge, however, noted that the listed reagents could “encompass 
something like half a million possible compounds.”
102
  The 
compounds that the applicant listed provided no particular guidance 
or description of the creation of chlorpropamide.
103
  Analyzing the 
claim as a question of fact, the court held that the claim did not 
disclose chlorpropamide.
104
  Nothing in the claim, other than a list of 
different compounds, indicated that the applicant had actually 
invented chlorpropamide.
105
  Applying the written description 
requirement, the court essentially found that the applicant was not 
entitled to the broad patent he claimed merely because he disclosed 
the elements necessary to achieve a particular result—the creation of 
chlorpropamide.
106
  The patentee must show that he has possession of 
the specific invention—the species—that he is claiming, or for a 
broad patent, he must show that he has possession of the genus.
107
  
The CCPA’s holding in In re Ruschig reaffirmed the use of the written 
description requirement as a method to invalidate original claims. 
 
 97 See In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Upadhyaya, supra note 7, at 72. 
 98 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 991. 
 99 Id. at 993. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 994–96. 
 104 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995–96. 
 105 Id. at 995. 
 106 Id. at 995–96.  
 107 Alison Aubrey Richards, Ariad v. Eli Lilly—The Federal Circuit Confirms the 




JAKAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  4:51 PM 
1302 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1287 
C. Modern Use of Written Description in the CAFC 
In more recent years, the CAFC has continuously used the 
written description requirement to invalidate original claims.  Regents 
of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. (“Lilly”),
108
 heard before a 
panel of the CAFC, is one of the more significant cases applying the 
written description to modern patents.
109
  The plaintiffs in Lilly 
discovered the gene sequence that allowed the production of rat 
insulin.
110
  Insulin is commonly used to treat people afflicted with 
diabetes.
111
  The claims at issue claimed broad categories including 
the genetic code to “vertebrates” and “mammalian and human 
insulin.”
112
  The CAFC held the broad claims invalid for failure to 
satisfy the written description.
113
  In its reasoning, the court cited 
plaintiff’s failure to precisely describe the broad class of “vertebrate 
or mammalian insulin cDNA” that the plaintiff was claiming.
114
  But 
because the rat DNA sequence was merely one species of a broader 
genus of claims that include all vertebrate DNA, the discovery and 
recitation of the rat insulin code did not sufficiently describe the 
other sequences that plaintiff attempted to claim.
115
 
Distinguishing the written description from other patentability 
doctrines, the court noted that with the rat DNA sequence, a person 
of ordinary skill in the art could eventually discover the human 
sequence.
116
  Thus, even if the description rendered the broad claims 
obvious,
117
 the written description was not necessarily satisfied.
118
  The 
court held, “[b]ecause the . . . specification provides only a general 
method of producing human insulin cDNA and a description of the 
human insulin A and B chain amino acid sequences that cDNA 
encodes, it does not provide a written description of human insulin 
cDNA.”
119
  The panel decision in Lilly regarding the use of the written 
 
 108 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 109 See Kelly, supra note 7; Upadhyaya, supra note 7.  But see Dennis Crouch, An 
Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Patent Examination, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 382, 393–94 (2010); Holman, supra note 79, at 4–5. 
 110 Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562–63. 
 111 Id. at 1562. 
 112 Id. at 1563. 
 113 Id. at 1568. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1568. 
 116 Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. 
 117 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 118 Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. 
 119 Id. (emphasis added). 
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description requirement to invalidate original claims sparked 
significant controversy and dissent among legal commentators and 





As noted, the first paragraph of § 112 contains another major 
requirement separate from the written description: enablement.  The 
relevant statutory text states: 
The specification shall contain . . . [a written description] of the 
manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled 
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same . . . .
121
 
Unlike the written description requirement, which is a question of 
fact,
122
 the enablement requirement is a question of law.
123
  The 
enablement requirement, like the written description requirement, is 
used to limit the scope of a patent.
124
  Enablement asks if a person of 
ordinary skill in the art could, at the time of filing, make and use the 
patentee’s claimed invention without “undue experimentation.”
125
  
Further, enablement does not specifically ask what the invention is or 
what the inventor invented; it merely asks if one of ordinary skill in 
the art could make the invention having read the specification.
126
  
Simply put, enablement focuses on what others can accomplish given 
 
 120 See, e.g., Holman, supra note 109 at 17–18. 
 121 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 122 See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 123 See Cantor, supra note 6, at 283.  Essentially, the written description 
requirement requires a factual determination of whether the specification itself 
demonstrates to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the 
actual invention.  Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.  Enablement, on the other hand, looks to 
whether certain information, which is necessary to the make and use of the 
invention, existed on the date that applicant filed for a patent.  See, e.g., In re Glass, 
492 F.2d 1228, 1231–32 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
 124 See Cantor, supra note 7, at 283–84. 
 125 Id.  When considering “undue experimentation,” courts look to a number of 
factors.  Id.  As articulated in In re Wands, these factors include: “(1) the quantity of 
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) 
the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) 
the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability 
or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.”  Wands, 858 F.2d at 
736; see also infra Part III (discussing unpredictability in biotechnology). 
 126 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1649. 
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a description of the invention (i.e., “can you make X”), while the 
written description requirement focuses on what the inventor actually 
disclosed (i.e., “what is X”).  The scope of what another can make 
given an inventor’s disclosure may not necessarily coincide with what 
an inventor actually invented. 
As two coexisting elements in paragraph one of § 112, 
enablement and written description are so often intertwined by the 
simple fact that in order to make an invention, one would almost 
certainly need to know what the invention is.
127
  Accordingly, the two 
requirements “often rise and fall together.”
128
  Cases like In re Ruschig, 
however, show that a disclosed invention might at times enable a 
person skilled in the art to make an invention even though the 
invention is not described.
129
  Additionally, enablement encourages 
expansive claims that include after-arising technology.
130
  While this 
encouragement may provide a positive incentive for patent applicants 
creating pioneering technologies, it also encourages inventors to 
provide generalized claims that may include inventions to which the 
inventors are not entitled.  The written description requirement 
articulated in Ariad provides a method for the courts to stop patent 
applicants who attempt to misuse the patent system by over-extending 
their claims to cover inventions that they have not yet invented.
131
  
Accordingly, investment and progress are encouraged as inventors 
can be confident that the system will adequately award exclusive 
rights. 
 
 127 § 112. 
 128 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. 
 129 Another example highlighted in the Ariad case is if an inventor claims a methyl 
compound, but fails to disclose a propyl or butyl compound.  Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352 
(citing In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).  While the process to 
make the methyl compound enables others to create the propyl and butyl 
compounds, the two compounds have not been described and are thus not entitled 
to a patent.  Id.  Accordingly, a claim should not be valid if it merely describes a 
broad method, while indicating that the inventor did not possess the full scope of the 
invention. 
 130 See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977).  A patent will not fail 
enablement merely because the state of the art or technology changes, thus enabling 
“after arising” technologies that are covered by the patent but were not intended by 
the initial disclosure.  Id.  
 131 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54. 
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III. BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT POLICY 
The patent law system is designed to “promote innovation by 
granting exclusive rights to encourage invention.”
132
  In order to 
accomplish this goal, the system must provide inventors with 
exclusive rights to their inventions as a reward for the time and 
money that they invested in the difficult work of invention, and at the 
same time, avoid stifling innovation by granting overbroad patents.
133
  
The biotechnology industry in particular requires careful analysis 
when granting patents due to both the nature of the science—the 




A. The Biotechnology Industry and Patents 
Biotechnology has been described as “any technique that uses 
living organisms or substances from these organisms to make or 
modify a product, to improve plants or animals, or to develop 
microorganisms for specific uses.”
135
  The broad array of modern 
biotechnology patents has largely been encouraged since the 1980 
Supreme Court case Diamond v. Chakrabarty.
136
  In Chakrabarty, the 
Supreme Court examined a patent concerning genetically modified 
bacteria.
137
  The Court held that the bacteria were patentable, noting 
that patentable subject matter included “anything under the sun that 
is made by man” and that “Congress plainly contemplated that the 
patent laws would be given wide scope.”
138
  The biotechnology 
products that are of primary concern to critics of Ariad generally 
include manipulations of genetic material, proteins, hormones, 
 
 132 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54; Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 22, at 1580. 
 133 See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54; Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1580–81; 
Cantor supra note 6, at 268. 
 134 Cantor, supra note 6, at 268. 
 135 Sandra Schmieder, Scope of Biotechnology Inventions in the United States and in 
Europe—Compulsory Licensing, Experimental Use and Arbitration: A Study of Patentability of 
DNA-Related Inventions with Special Emphasis on the Establishment of an Arbitration Based 
Compulsory Licensing System, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 163, 171 
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Linda R. Judge, Biotechnology: 
Highlights of the Science and Law Shaping the Industry, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 79, 79 (2004) (noting that biotechnology includes “the use of living 
organisms or their products to modify human health and/or the human 
environment typically by using the techniques of gene splicing and recombinant 
DNA technology”). 
 136 447 U.S. 309 (1980); see also Schmieder, supra note 135, at 84. 
 137 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
 138 Id. at 308–09. 
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genetic sequences, and chemical processes that eventually result in 
therapeutic treatments—more specifically, biopharmaceutical 
products.
139
  Resulting products and claims involve different drugs or 
gene sequences that are used medicinally, as diagnostic tests, or as a 
basis for further research.
140
  These products inherently have a high 
public demand due to the obvious social benefits (i.e., saving human 
lives and treating thousands of health conditions) they provide.
141
 
As a whole, biotechnology involves complex physiological 
systems that create a “high degree of uncertainty and risk.”
142
  Long-
term development costs are necessary to create new products or to 
improve upon old ones.
143
  Additionally, biotechnology can often lead 
 
 139 See Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 21–25 (2005); Schmieder, supra note 135, at 171–73. 
 140 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1676–78.  Over the years, courts have 
attempted to pinpoint the scope of patentable biotechnology products.  For 
example, prior to Chakrabarty, in In re Fischer, the CCPA examined a claim for a 
complex solution containing adrenocorticotrophic hormones (ACTH).  427 F.2d 
833, 834 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  The solution was useful because it could be injected safely 
into humans as a treatment for arthritis.  Id.  The court held that a description of 
amino acids—sequences of DNA form corresponding amino acids—was sufficient 
structural information to identify the claimed invention; however, the claim was 
incomplete because it only included twenty-four of the thirty-nine amino acids 
required to complete the sequence.  Id. at 836.  Further, the patentee attempted to 
claim any ACTH solution having a potency range greater than 111%.  Id. at 834.  The 
court held that the scope far exceeded the inventor’s actual claim because his 
solution was limited to 230%.  Id. at 839.   
     Subsequent cases dealing with biotechnology products demanded even more 
specific disclosures.  See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 589 F.3d 1336, 1350 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that in order to claim a broad genus, an inventor must 
disclose “a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus . . . 
so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus”); 
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding 
that method claims involving chemicals other than DNA and RNA must also describe 
actual compounds and sufficient materials that obtain the desired result, thus 
outlining the scope of the claimed invention); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that a method for preparing a 
sequence of DNA or the corresponding amino acid sequence does not sufficiently 
describe the scope of a claim under § 112 and noting that such claims “require a 
precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical 
properties”); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that an 
adequate written description of DNA requires a disclosure of the DNA sequence and 
not merely the corresponding mRNA reference from which the DNA sequence could 
be obtained); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213–14 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (holding that the inventor could not claim all genetic sequences that 
produced EPO-like (a hormone) activity merely by disclosing “the gene and a 
handful of analogs whose activity has not been clearly ascertained”). 
 141 See Schmieder, supra note 135, at 178. 
 142 Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1676. 
 143 Id. 
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to unforeseeable functions and research results with any product, 
even if that product has been available and improved upon for many 
years.
144
  Further, because much of the technology involves testing on 
human patients and high-risk consequences to consumers, the 
industry is heavily regulated.
145
  Accordingly, the costs and risks 
associated with creating biotechnology products are enormous. 
For example, in its amicus brief in Ariad on behalf of Eli Lilly, 
Amgen Inc., a pioneer in the biotechnology industry, discussed the 
difficulties of producing biotechnology products.
146
  Amgen 
explained that costs for research and development “for each 
successful therapeutic product” average between “$800 million to 
$1.2 billion” and that such products typically take over ten years to 
develop.
147
  Further, “only five out of 250 products ever make it to 
human testing, and for every product that does make it to market, 
approximately nine products fail in clinical testing.”
148
  Even still, “of 
those products that make it to market, only about 20% ever recoup 
the average investment cost.”
149
  Additionally, the relative ease of 
creating a generic follow-on product that avoids the risk, uncertainty, 
and many other complications associated with creating biotechnology 
drugs leaves innovators of these products in a position in which they 




B. Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts 
The most important influence on the growth of the 
biotechnology industry was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.
151
  In fact, 
some believe the Act to be “possibly the most inspired piece of 
 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id.  See, e.g., Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(e), 156 (2006) 
and 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2006)). 
 146 Brief for Amgen, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, 13–15, 
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV-
11280). 
 147 Id. at 13–14. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 15. 
 150 See Burk and Lemley, supra note 22, at 1677. 
 151 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006); see also Heather Hamme Ramirez, Comment, 
Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination of the “Tragedy of the 
Anticommons” in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 364–65 
(2004). 
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legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-century.”
152
  
The Act’s primary purpose was to use the patent system to promote 
collaboration between federally funded research institutions and 
private industry, which was designed to further overall biotechnology 
innovation.
153
  Bayh-Dole encouraged innovation by (i) ensuring that 
“private parties contributing to publicly funded research would retain 
the right to develop any subsequent inventions,” (ii) motivating the 
“employees of government-owned, government operated laboratories 
to make and license commercializable inventions,” and (iii) “favoring 
American over foreign industry in conferring ownership rights to 
publicly funded technology.”
154
  Essentially, government-subsidized 
research institutions were allowed to retain patents, unlike the 
previous framework, in which such patents became the property of 
the government.
155
  The Bayh-Dole Act worked in conjunction with 
the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980.
156
  The 
Stevenson-Wydler Act explained the potential for scientific progress 
through cooperative research, noting how discoveries were occurring 
in university and federal laboratories, but were being implemented 
for public and commercial use through private industry.
157
  Thus, the 
 
 152 Editorial, Innovation’s Golden Goose, 365 ECONOMIST 3, 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/1476653. 
 153 According to Congress: 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to 
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported 
research or development; to encourage maximum participation of 
small business firms in federally supported research and development 
efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and 
nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that 
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms 
are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise 
without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to 
promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions 
made in the United States by United States industry and labor; to 
ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in federally 
supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and 
protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; 
and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this area. 
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006); see also Dana Katz & Jon F. Merz, Patents and Licensing, Policy, 
Patenting of Inventions Developed with Public Funds, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, 
LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 854, 861–62 (Thomas H. Murray & 
Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000); John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and 
Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 
120 (2001). 
 154 Id. § 200. 
 155 Id. 
 156 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3714 (2006). 
 157 § 3701. 
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Act’s main purpose was to “[renew, expand, and strengthen]” 
cooperation between these public and private entities through 
“technology transfer, personal exchange, joint research projects” and 
more.
158
  Both Acts authorized the creation of technology transfer 
offices at universities, nonprofit facilities, and federally funded 
research institutions that provided a mechanism for publicly funded 




Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, the high risk/reward ratio for 
investing in biotechnology was such that few companies or 
institutions looked at developing these products.
160
  Before the Act, a 
mere five percent of discoveries that the National Institutes of Health 
funded resulted in new improved products related to biotechnology 
innovation.
161
  Within thirty years of passage, the Act has created over 
5,000 new companies based around university research.
162
  In those 
same thirty years, these companies developed “153 new drugs, 
vaccines or in vitro devices” that made it to the market.
163
  The Bayh-
Dole Act is credited with creating the biotechnology industry in the 
United States, and has been described as “possibly the most 




Specifically, the economic growth of universities demonstrates 
the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act.  In 1997, universities accounted for 
almost $500 million in biotechnology proceeds from their own 
patents.
165
  That number went to almost $1 billion by 2002.
166
  
Additionally, as of 1981, universities had 436 biotechnology patents, 
 
 158 § 3701; see also § 3702. 
 159 Id. § 3710; 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). 
 160 See Phyllis Gardner Testimony, BIO (July 10, 2002), 
http://www3.bio.org/ip/action/tt20030710.asp. 
 161 Id.  The National Institutes of Health, the top medical research agency in the 
United States, is “the largest source of funding for medical research in the world.”  
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/index.html (last visited June 10, 
2012). 
 162 Thirty Years After Passage, Bayh-Dole Act Drives the Economy, Protects Public Health, 
NEWSWISE (May 3, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.newswise.com/articles/thirty-years-
after-passage-bayh-dole-act-drives-the-economy-protects-public-health. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id.; Chester G. Moore, Comment, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 152 (quoting Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 152, 
at 3). 
 165 See Rowe, supra note 26, at 295. 
 166 Id. 
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while in 2001 they had nearly 3,203.
167
  As a whole, biotech patents 
increased from 18,695 in 1996 to 47,473 in 2002, a 154% increase.
168
  
Even in recent years, startup investment and new product 
development through technology transfers remains high.  In 2008 
and 2009 combined, as a result of university research, 1,306 new 
commercial products were introduced and 1,196 new companies 
were formed.
169
  Overall investment has also been consistently high, 
with sponsored research expenditures totaling $111.37 billion over 
the same two years.
170
  In 2009 alone, the total licensing income 
through technology transfer offices totaled $2.3 billion.
171
 
Notwithstanding this tremendous success, the Bayh-Dole Act is 
not without its critics and its problems.  The quick expansion of the 
biotechnology industry, coupled with the granting of broad patents 
for biotechnology inventions and research tools, has created concern 
regarding downstream biotechnology research.
172
  Future products 
often require the use of a combination of many different previously 
patented products.
173
  If a patentee holding a broad or crucial patent 
refuses to license his invention, or if the cost of licensing is 
prohibitively expensive, future inventors will be unable to perform 
even the basic research necessary to create additional improvements 
in the field.
174
  Even when an inventor is able to purchase the 
necessary licenses, research costs begin to increase significantly with 
each additional product purchase.
175
  With each subsequent 
innovation, inventors must charge higher prices for their own 
 
 167 Id. 
 168 See Schmieder, supra note 135, at 177. 
 169 Press Release, Ass’n of Univ. Tech. Managers, AUTM U.S. Licensing Activity 
Survey Summary: FY2009 (2009), available at 
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Documents&Template=/CM/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=5237; Press Release, Ass’n of Univ. Tech. Managers, 
AUTM U.S. Licensing Activity Survey Summary: FY2008 (2008) [hereinafter AUTM 
2008], available at 
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Licensing_Surveys_AUTM&CON
TENTID=4513&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm [hereinafter AUTM 2009].   
 170 AUTM 2008, supra note 169; AUTM 2009, supra note 169. 
 171 AUTM 2009, supra note 169. 
 172 See, e.g., Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem 
Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 347 (2004).  Research tools are devices or products that are necessary to 
perform basic research.  Id. at 348. 
 173 Moore, supra note 164, at 154. 
 174 Derzko, supra note 172, at 348; see also infra notes 323–40 and accompanying 
text. 
 175 Moore, supra note 164, at 155. 
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products in order to recover the costs spent on obtaining licenses.
176
  
This increased cost is eventually transferred to the average 
consumer.
177
  In addition to rising costs, some argue that allowing 
federally funded research institutions to gain patent protection 
essentially translates to a government giveaway.
178
  Patents that would 
normally be owned by the government would now belong to private 
industries and the research institutions themselves.
179
 
Overall, the Bayh-Dole Act as a whole was a fundamental shift in 
the incentive structure for research and development at federally 
funded institutions.
180
  Providing universities and other federally 
funded institutions with access to the patent system gave commercial 
investors a financial incentive to tap into the facilities where a 
significant amount of research was already being performed.
181
  
Consequently, the growth of the U.S. biotechnology industry can be 
directly tied to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
182
 
The Act led to a tremendous increase in private investment in 
universities and, in turn, to great progress in innovation.
183
  As 
universities began to profit from investment and patent protection, 
however, concerns arose regarding patent infringement by 
institutions that were no longer protected by the experimental use 
doctrine.
184
  Under this doctrine, researchers could use patented 
devices in their research without becoming susceptible to an 
infringement suit as long as the research was merely philosophical 
curiosity as opposed to motivated by profit.
185
  Once universities were 
able to gain patent protection, research that led to profit became 
more commonplace.
186
  Particularly, in a 1984 case involving 
biopharmaceutical products, the CAFC severely restricted the 
experimental use exception, holding that entities developing generic 
versions of patented products while the patent was still in force no 
 
 176 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1611–13 
 177 Id. 
 178 Moore, supra note 164, at 154. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See Sara Boettiger and Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-Dole: If We Knew Then What We 
Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, 320–23 (2006). 
 181 Id.; see also 32 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006). 
 182 See Boettiger, supra note 179, at 320–23; see also §§ 200–212. 
 183 Rowe, supra note 26, at 295–97. 
 184 See id. at 290. 
 185 Id. at 284.  There is also an experimental use exception involving “use” under.  
Id. § 102(b).  This paper focuses on the experimental use “research” exception as 
codified under § 271(e).  See infra notes 189–205 and accompanying text. 
 186 See Rowe, supra note 26, at 290. 
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longer fit under the exception.
187
  Continuing to pursue the overall 
goal of promoting private-public collaboration in biotech research, 
Congress’ responded swiftly to the CAFC’s holding by passing the 
Hatch-Waxman Act that same year.
188
 
The Hatch-Waxman Act provided another huge boost to 
biotechnology innovation and collaborative research by codifying an 
experimental use research exception against infringement claims for 
those developing biopharmaceutical products.
189
  As a trade-off, 
inventors received longer exclusivity periods while generic product 
developers and researchers were free to use the patented inventions 
during the course of the patent life.
190
  Working in conjunction with 
the Act’s abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process, 
researchers could, without infringing, perform the necessary testing 
for FDA approval of their generic products while the corresponding 
original product was still under patent protection.
191
  As a result of 
Hatch-Waxman, generic products were ready to hit the market as 
soon as the originator’s patent expired.
192
 
Under the Hatch-Waxman and Bayh-Dole Acts, private investors 
have tremendous financial incentives to collaborate with universities 
and other research institutions.  Since Congress passed these Acts, 
academic institutions that previously relied almost entirely on federal 
funding are now able to transfer much of their biopharmaceutical 
research focus to industry-driven research.
193
  As non-profit 
 
 187 Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rowe, 
supra note 26, at 290. 
 188 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 
(2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(2000)). 
 189 Section 271(e) of Title 35 states 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological 
product . . . which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, 
recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving 
site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs or veterinary biological products. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006).  Subsequent case law extended the exception to medical 
devices.  See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 190 Rowe, supra note 26, at 293–94. 
 191 Id. at 294. 
 192 Id. 
 193 See Michael D. Witt & Susan K. Lehnhardt, Transferring Innovations from 
Academic Research Institutions to Industry: Overview, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, 
LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 153, at 1081, 1082. 
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institutions, academic research centers have traditionally pursued 
educational and basic research.
194
  As federal support for research has 
decreased, the private-public collaborative effort has grown.
195
  
Consequently, universities are encouraged to target commercializable 
products over purely philosophical endeavors.
196
  The pursuit of 
profit, however, might occasionally seem in conflict with an academic 
institution’s mission to further progress and learning if the institution 
decides to focus on pure money-making projects instead of 
groundbreaking high-risk research.
197
  Accordingly, private gain can 
at times work against the greater good of creating useful 
technologies.
198
  Conversely, pursuing private gain also encourages 
the pursuit of products that might actually become available to the 
public as opposed to less productive research.
199
  To balance these 
conflicting policies, universities must have incentives to pursue 
practical research and, at the same time, incentives to pursue 
groundbreaking research at the cost of profit.  At the same time there 
must also be a balance between the incentives awarded to universities 
and the industry’s ability to continually invest and compete.
200
 
The experimental use exception provides an important 
incentive for universities to continue to improve the progress in an 
area of biopharmaceutical research.  The CAFC at times, however, 
appears to be at odds with the congressional intent to encourage 
private-public collaboration through the exception.  In Merck KGaA v. 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., the Supreme Court bolstered the Hatch-
Waxman research exception, overturning the CAFC’s narrow 
reading.
201
  The Court interpreted § 271(e) as encompassing all 
research that is “reasonably related” to possible submissions under 
federal law and not merely research for generic products.
202
  In 
another CAFC case, Madey v. Duke University, the court essentially 
 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 1082–83. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Witt & Lehnhardt, supra note 193, at 1082–83. 
 200 See infra notes 333–47 and accompanying text. 
 201 545 U.S. 193 (2005); see Rowe, supra note 26, at 295.  The CAFC would have 
excluded “(1) experimentation on drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an 
FDA submission or (2) use of patented compounds in experiments that are not 
ultimately submitted to the FDA” from the § 271(e) safe harbor.  Merck, 545 U.S. at 
206.  Effectively, the CAFC wanted to limit § 271 safe harbor to only generic 
products.  Id. 
 202 Merck, 545 U.S. at 206–07. 
JAKAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  4:51 PM 
1314 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1287 
eliminated the common law experimental use exception for 
academic and other non-profit institutions.
203
  The court held that 
even though universities often promote research projects that have 
“arguably no commercial application whatsoever,” these projects still 
“further the institution’s legitimate business objectives” through 
reputational benefits, the lure of research grants, and additional 
students and faculty.
204
  Accordingly, academic institutions will rarely 
satisfy the experimental use exception unless they are performing § 
271(e) biopharmaceutical research.
205
  In light of these two cases, 
biopharmaceutical research provides a unique investment 
opportunity for private investors looking to tap into academic 
research institutions. 
Overall, Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman have fostered private-
public collaboration.  In general, however, the goals of private 
industry are to seek a profit, while the goals of university research are 
primarily to promote the pursuit of educational interests and high-
cost groundbreaking research.
206
  Accordingly, even though Bayh-
Dole and Hatch-Waxman have largely been positive for 
biotechnology innovation, a significant imbalance occurs between the 
two sides if universities performing research are awarded too much 
protection against infringement and are granted broad patents for 
basic research.
207
  Furthering the imbalance, universities rarely attack 
each other’s patents or research.
208
  A possible indicator of a growing 
imbalance is the fact that universities have begun winning large 
infringement suits against commercial companies in the 
pharmaceutical industry.
209
  If universities receive broad patents for 
basic research, the biotechnology industry would likely face 
significant hurdles to its own research due to increased costs to either 
 
 203 307 F.3d 1351 (2002).  The Madey case was an infringement action brought by 
Professor Madey, a former professor at Duke.  Id. at 1361–62.  The CAFC found 
Duke liable for using Madey’s laser once Madey was no longer at Duke.  Id. 
 204 Id. at 1362. 
 205 Rowe, supra note 26, at 293. 
 206 Witt & Lehnhardt, supra note 193, at 1082. 
 207 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1611–13. 
 208 See Rowe, supra note 26, at 301–04.  Rowe notes that universities have little to 
gain by suing each other and much to lose.  Id. at 298.  A suit will fail if the infringing 
university is working purely for research and public universities have certain 
immunities from infringement suits altogether.  Id. at 304 (citing Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647–48 (1999)).  
Further, suing another university brings bad publicity and discourages collaborative 
projects with the attacking university and others, including the commercial industry.  
Id. at 303–04. 
 209 See Rowe, supra note 27, at 301–04. 
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obtain licenses or settle infringement suits with universities.
210
  
Additionally, as basic research in particular is difficult to discover 
until disclosed, companies would have an even more difficult time 
knowing what patent they may have infringed upon.
211
 
If the industry as a whole is to maintain its success, courts must 
find ways to preserve the balance between public and private research 
entities and limit the negative impact of broad biotechnology patents 
within the current system.  The Ariad decision and the court’s 
modern application of the written description requirement exemplify 
the CAFC’s willingness to directly address these issues.
212
  The Ariad 
case involved a number of extremely broad method claims included 
in a patent owned jointly by university researchers and the biotech 
company Ariad Pharmaceuticals.
213
  Overall, the discovery was 
groundbreaking and tremendously helpful to other researchers.
214
  
The claims at issue, however, were more of a prediction of where the 
technology would progress as opposed to an actual product.
215
 
In Ariad, the CAFC recognized that in unpredictable fields like 
biotechnology, improperly granted overbroad patents are of 
particular concern, and thus a high level of scrutiny is required.
216
  
Requirements that rely on the level of technology in the field, 
enablement in particular, may not catch every improper broad 
patent.  The CAFC thus used the written description requirement to 
simplify its inquiry.  Because Ariad did not include enough specific 
examples to identify its broad claims, the claims were invalid for 
failure to satisfy the written description requirement.
217
  If private-
public collaboration is to be encouraged, and the congressional 
intent of the Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts furthered, there 
must be greater protection for entities that are able to fully invest in 
developing a finalized product.
218
  Following the trend dating back to 
Evans, Morse, and the more recent Lilly decision, the CAFC in Ariad 
used the written description requirement as a separate and distinct 
inquiry from the enablement requirement to provide this additional 
 
 210 Id. at 301. 
 211 Id. at 309. 
 212 See Ariad Pharm., Inc., v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358–60 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (Newman, J., concurring). 
 213 See infra notes 228–31 and accompanying text. 
 214 See infra notes 232–38 and accompanying text. 
 215 See infra notes 236–48 and accompanying text. 
 216 See infra notes 278–99 and accompanying text. 
 217 See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 218 See discussion infra Part V. 
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protection.
219
  In order to fully understand how this requirement 
provides the necessary protection, the following section provides an 
in-depth look into the Ariad case.  The following part looks at the 
CAFC’s justifications for its holding and discusses why the court’s use 
of the written description requirement was appropriate.  Further, it 
discusses how the opinion specifically applies to certain 
biotechnology claims. 
IV. ARIAD V. ELI LILLY 
In order to manage the problematic rise in overbroad patents in 
biotechnology, the CAFC in Ariad reemphasized the need for a 
separate and distinct written description requirement as applied to 
original claims.
220
  Thirteen years after the court’s controversial 
reassertion of the requirement in Lilly, the CAFC finally weighed in 
en banc on the separate purpose and scope of the written description 
requirement.  In Ariad, the court analyzed two key issues: “(1) 
[w]hether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written 
description requirement separate from an enablement requirement” 
and “(2) [i]f a separate written description requirement is set forth in 
the statute, what is the scope and purpose of that requirement.”
221
  
The court came to the ultimate conclusion that the written 
description requirement is a separate and distinct requirement for 
patentability and that when claiming a broad generic invention, an 
inventor must show he has invented a sufficient number of species to 
support a broader claim.
222
 
The Ariad case involved an allegation of patent infringement of 
U.S. patent 6,410,516 by, among other parties, Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., against Eli Lilly & Company.
223
  Ariad originally 
sued in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts.
224
  At trial, a jury found infringement and did not 
invalidate any of the asserted claims in the patent.
225
  On appeal, a 
panel of CAFC judges “reversed the district court’s denial of Lilly’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law and held the asserted claims 
 
 219 Ariad Pharm., Inc., v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 220 Id. at 1336. 
 221 Id. at 1342. 
 222 Id. at 1349. 
 223 Id. at 1340. 
 224 Id.; see Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D. Mass. 
2007). 
 225 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340. 
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invalid for lack of written description.”
226
  The CAFC then accepted 
Ariad’s petition for a rehearing en banc regarding the interpretation 
of § 112 and the written description requirement.
227
 
Ariad alleged that two of Eli Lilly’s “pharmaceutical products” 
infringed on several claims in Ariad’s patent.
228
  The overall scope of 
the claims effectively included “the desired result of reducing the 
binding of NF-K[B] to NF-[K]B recognition sites” without specific 
examples as to how this reduction was to be accomplished.
229
  NF-
[K]B is an inactive protein
230
 found in many different cell types.
231
  If 
NF-[K]B is activated through external stimuli, including diseases like 
cancer and AIDS, it travels and binds to other cells causing the cells 
to create proteins that help them survive against the infection.
232
  
While the NF-[K]B’s primary purpose appears to be beneficial, the 
 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id.  The claims were as follows:  
80. [A method for modifying effects of external influences on a 
eukaryotic cell, which external influences induce NF-[K]B-mediated 
intracellular signaling, the method comprising altering NF-[K]B 
activity in the cells such that NF-[K]B-mediated effects of external 
influences are modified, wherein NF-[K]B activity in the cell is 
reduced] wherein reducing NF-[K]B activity comprises reducing 
binding of NF-[K]B to NF-[K]B recognition sites on genes which are 
transcriptionally regulated by NF-[K]B. 
95. [A method for reducing, in eukaryotic cells, the level of expression 
of genes which are activated by extracellular influences which induce 
NF-[K]B-mediated intracellular signaling, the method comprising 
reducing NF-[K]B activity in the cells such that expression of said genes 
is reduced], carried out on human cells. 
144. [A method for reducing bacterial lipopolysaccharide-induced 
expression of cytokines in mammalian cells, which method comprises 
reducing NF-[K]B activity in the cells so as to reduce bacterial 
lipopolysaccharide-induced expression of said cytokines in the cells] 
wherein reducing NF-[K]B activity comprises reducing binding of NF-
[K]B to NF-[K]B recognition sites on genes which are transcriptionally 
regulated by NF-[K]B. 
145. [A method for reducing bacterial lipopolysaccharide-induced 
expression of cytokines in mammalian cells, which method comprises 
reducing NF-[K]B activity in the cells so as to reduce bacterial 
lipopolysaccharide-induced expression of said cytokines in the cells], 
carried out on human cells. 
Id. at 1340–41.  
 229 Id. at 1341; see also infra notes 236–48 and accompanying text. 
 230 NF-[K]B is inhibited by a specific protein, “I[K]B” or “Inhibitor of kappa B.”  
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340. 
 231 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 232 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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protein becomes harmful to the host if it is produced in excess.
233
  
Accordingly, any method that reduced the binding of NF-[K]B to NF-
[K]B recognition sites, and thereby limited the production of the 
activated proteins, would have “enormous and wide-ranging 
therapeutic effects.”
234
  Ariad was not only the first to identify NF-
[K]B, but also the first to discover the “mechanism” by which NF-
[K]B is activated and responds to infections.
235
  Despite Ariad’s 
breakthrough discovery, it did not, at the time of filing, discover a 
specific method for achieving its desired result of reducing NF-[K]B 
activity.
236
  Ariad disclosed three possible molecules that could 
“potentially” reduce NF-[K]B activity: specific inhibitors, dominantly 
interfering molecules, and decoy molecules.
237
 
Regarding these molecules, first, Ariad listed only I-[K]B
238
 as a 
specific inhibitor; however, Ariad only noted that if one of ordinary 
skill were to isolate natural I-[K]B, he could reduce NF-[K]B.
239
  
Isolation of I-[K]B would require further experimentation.
240
  Ariad’s 
“invitation for further research” showed that it did not have 
“possession” of a method to reduce NF-[K]B through specific 
inhibitors.
241
  Second, Ariad failed to disclose a single “dominantly 
interfering molecule.”
242
  Ariad also admitted that it did not 
necessarily know how to create a specific dominantly interfering 
molecule.
243
  Thus, Ariad was not in “possession” of the claimed 
method of reducing NF-[K]B through dominantly interfering 
molecules.  Finally, Ariad did in fact disclose structural examples of 
“decoy molecules.”
244
  But, Ariad failed to describe the binding of 
 
 233 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340. 
 234 Ariad, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 112. 
 235 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340. 
 236 See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355–58; supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 237 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355; see also infra notes 238–47 and accompanying text. 
 238 I-[K]B occurs naturally in the body and keeps NF-[K]B inactive until the cell 
receives external influences, such as infections.  Id. at 1356. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id.  A dominantly interfering molecule is in effect part of an NF-[K]B molecule 
which would bind in place of NF-[K]B but not have the negative properties of NF-
[K]B.  Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1357.  Decoy molecules are different molecules from NF-
[K]B that would “mimic” NF-[K]B and bind in place of NF-[K]B receptors, thereby 
blocking the binding of the NF-[K]B molecules themselves.  Id. 
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these decoy molecules or whether or not they would be effective.
245
  
After analyzing all three of Ariad’s claimed methods for reducing NF-
[K]B, the court concluded that the claims merely described general 
molecular structures and hypothesized how they might reduce NF-
[K]B activity.
246
  Ariad’s claims, covering nearly any method to reduce 
NF-[K]B, were significantly broader than anything it had disclosed, 
and therefore the claims were invalid for failure to satisfy the written 
description requirement of § 112.
247
 
Before specifically analyzing Ariad’s claims under the written 
description requirement, the court first had to answer Ariad’s 
assertion that the written description requirement, as articulated by 
the CAFC, was not separate from the enablement requirement.
248
  
The court would then have to establish the scope of the written 
description requirement before going forward with analyzing the 
claims themselves.
249
  To address the first issue, the court looked to 
the language of § 112, Supreme Court precedent, stare decisis, the 
CCPA case In re Ruschig,
250
 the application of the written description 
requirement to original claims, and finally, to its own precedent.
251
 
First, the CAFC looked to the language of § 112 to determine 
the meaning of the written description requirement as separate from 
the enablement requirement.
252
  Again, the relevant statutory text is 
as follows: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, 
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 




Ariad argued that the statute merely required a written description 
“(i) of the invention, and (ii) of the manner and process of making 
and using it,” which should be “in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use 
 
 245 Id.  The court noted that “there is no descriptive link between the table of 
decoy molecules and reducing NF-[K]B activity.”  Id. 
 246 Id. at 1358. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at 1342. 
 249 Id. 
 250 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 251 Id. at 1342–51. 
 252 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1343. 
 253 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see also Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1343. 
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the same.”
254
  Thus, Ariad’s reading merged the written description 
requirement and the enablement requirement.  The court, however, 
disagreed with this reading and confirmed that the specification must 
contain (i) a written description of the invention and (ii) a written 
description of the manner and process of making and using the 
invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable 
any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.”
255
  The 
court further explained that the written description requirement has 
been “expressly” included in the Patent Act as early as 1793.
256
  The 
court noted that Congress has never indicated any intention to 
remove or amend the requirement despite numerous recodifications 
of the Patent Act.
257
  Finally, the court also noted that the separate 
written description requirement has been a staple of the “quid pro 
quo” of patent law where one must describe what his invention is.
258
  
Without this description, the public would not know an inventor 
possessed his claimed invention, and it would not know the breadth 
of the patent and whether or not it was infringing on the patent.  
Second, the CAFC examined Supreme Court precedent and 
agreed with Lilly’s argument that the Supreme Court has “continually 
confirmed the existence of a separate written description 
requirement.”
259
  The CAFC looked to Morse, noting that the Court 
rejected the inventor’s broad claim because he had not described 
and could not show possession of the process that he was claiming, 
which indicated that he had not invented what he claimed.
260
  
Looking to Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., the CAFC 
discussed the Supreme Court’s post-1836 interpretation of § 112.
261
  
In Schriber-Schroth, the Court held that § 112 required a patent 
application to satisfy enablement and “to inform the public during 
the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it 
 
 254 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1343 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 255 Id. at 1344.  Part “(i)” is the written description requirement and part “(ii)” is 
enablement.  See id. 
 256 Id. at 1345. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1345. (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853); Schriber-
Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47 (1938); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)).  Schriber involved a patent for an 
improvement of the pistons in a gas engine.  Schriber--Schroth , 305 U.S. at 57.  The 
Court examined an amendment to the patent that described “flexible” webs where 
the original claim only described “extremely rigid” webs.  Id. at 54–55. 
 260 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1346 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113). 
 261 Id. 
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may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured 
without a license and which may not.”
262
  Finally, the CAFC looked to 
the more recent Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 
decision.
263
  The Court in Festo noted that a patent application must 
“describe, enable, and set forth the best mode of carrying out the 
invention.”
264
  Further, the Court noted that an inventor’s claim must 
be the same as the disclosed specification.
265
  Essentially, the 
specification cannot be broader than the actual invention.  If this is 
the case, the claims should not issue.
266
  Once again, the CAFC 
reiterated that the purpose of the written description is “to provide 
notice of the boundaries of the [patentee’s] right to exclude and to 
define limits,” or in other words, to “disclose and teach[].”
267
 
Third, the CAFC briefly noted that it was obligated to uphold 
the separate written description requirement under the doctrine of 
stare decisis.
268
  To that end, the court expressed the common 
 
 262 Id.  
 263 Id. at 1347. 
 264 Festo, 535 U.S. at 736.  The primary issues in Festo involved prosecution history 
estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents.  Id. at 726.  The inventor in Festo amended 
his original claims in order to avoid a rejection from the Patent Office under § 112.  
Id. at 728.  The original application contained a method of operation that was 
“unclear.”  Id.  Prosecution history estoppel arises when a patent applicant amends 
his claims during patent prosecution in order to ensure patentability.  Id. at 735.  
When a patent applicant amends his claims, he is estopped from using the doctrine 
of equivalents with regard to the amended claim in a subsequent infringement suit.  
Id. at 734–35.  The doctrine of equivalents is a court-made doctrine that allows a 
patent to cover not only the literal meanings of a patentee’s claims, but also 
equivalents that a court could infer the patentee intended to cover; it provides the 
patentee with additional protection.  Id. at 731–32.  See generally Graver Tank & Mfg. 
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (discussing the doctrine of 
equivalents).  Even though these amendments are usually designed to avoid 
potentially invalidating prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102, additional reasons will also 
give rise to prosecution history estoppel.  Festo, 535 U.S. at 735–36.  Amendments 
designed to obtain patent approval under § 112 will give rise to prosecution history 
estoppel.  Id. at 736.  If a patentee amends his claims to narrow the scope of his 
patent, it is possible that he initially claimed more than he was entitled to.  Id. at 736–
37.  Festo looks to all the potential reasons a claim might not issue or be found invalid 
during the patent prosecution, including the written description.  Id.  Accordingly, 
Festo supports the CAFC’s holding that the written description is not only a separate 
and distinct requirement but also that it can be used to invalidate overbroad original 
claims that should not have been issued in the first place.  See Warner-Jenkinson v. 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997) (holding that a patentee may rebut a 
presumption of prosecution history estoppel if he shows that the amendments were 
not substantially related to patentability). 
 265 Festo, 535 U.S. at 736. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1347. 
 268 Id. 
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sentiment in patent law that, to encourage innovation, the courts 
should not alter the “settled expectations of the inventing and 
investing community.”
269
  This is particularly true regarding claims for 
biotechnology patents, such as the one in Ariad, because the 
biotechnology industry is particularly susceptible to changes in 
expectations due to the high-risk nature of investment.
270
 
Fourth, the CAFC looked to the 1967 CCPA case In re Ruschig.
271
  
In In re Ruschig, the CCPA specifically distinguished written 
description as a distinct requirement of § 112.
272
  The inventors in In 
re Ruschig attempted to amend their broad original claim to include a 
specific chemical compound that they had not originally disclosed.
273
  
In rejecting the broad claim, the CCPA explained that enablement 
was “beside the point.”
274
  Because the specification failed to describe 
the specific chemical compound that the inventors were claiming, the 
inventors clearly did not disclose what they actually invented.
275
  Ariad 
argued that the In re Ruschig rejection relied on either enablement or 
§ 132’s rejection of new matter.
276
  The CAFC, however, interpreted In 
re Ruschig as focusing on the inventor’s failure to describe the claim 
itself, which would have evidenced possession of the invention, not 
necessarily the subsequent amendments to the claim.
277
 
Fifth, the CAFC rejected Ariad’s argument that the written 
description was always satisfied in the original claims because that 
initial disclosure itself is the written description that must then be 
used to determine the validity of future amendments.
278
  The CAFC, 
 
 269 Id. at 1347; see Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1668–75; Kelly, supra note 7, at 
252; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“In the area of patents, it 
is especially important that the law remain stable and clear.”) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 270 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1343. 
 271 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1347. 
 272 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995–96. 
 273 Id. at 991. 
 274 Id. at 995. 
 275 Id. at 995–96. 
 276 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1348; see also 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006).  Section 132 ’allows 
patent examiners to disallow an amendment if a party seeks to add something new to 
their original claim on reissue.  Id.; § 251. 
 277 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1348.  Notably, in In re Ruschig, the court explained:  
It is no help in finding a trail or in finding one’s way through the woods where the 
trails have disappeared—or have not yet been made . . . to be confronted simply by a 
large number of unmarked trees.  Appellants are pointing to trees.  We are looking 
for blaze marks which single out particular trees.  We see none. 
379 F.2d at 994–95. 
 278 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349. 
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however, quickly noted that there is no statutory language that limits 
the written description to Ariad’s interpretation.
279
  The court 
explained that the written description requirement was necessary to 
ensure that an inventor actually invented a generic (genus) claim.
280
  
The disclosure must include a sufficient number of species within the 
genus or “structural features common to the members of a genus so 
that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of 
the genus” to demonstrate that the inventor actually possessed, or 
invented, the generic invention.
281
  The written description might also 
be satisfied if, in a functional claim, those in the art can establish a 
correlation between structure and function.
282
  Ariad’s claim failed to 
satisfy the written description because Ariad’s method claims 
described a genus method for accomplishing a result but did not 




Finally, the court looked to its own precedent to describe the 
scope and purpose of the written description requirement.
284
  The 
court articulated its’ test for written description as “whether the 
disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those 
skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed 
subject matter as of the filing date.”
285
  More specifically, one must 
show “possession as shown in the disclosure” or that a person skilled 
in the art would know “that the inventor actually invented the 
invention claimed.”
286
  Because the written description inquiry is a 
question of fact, the requirements for each claim will vary depending 
on ‘“the existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and 
 
 279 Id. at 1349.  The CAFC explained: “[T]he statute does not say ‘The 
specification shall contain a written description of the invention for purposes of 
determining priority.’”  Id. 
 280 Id. at 1349–50. 
 281 Id at 1350 (citing Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568–69 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997)). 
 282 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350 (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 
956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  The correlation might be more recognizable as the 
technology and level of sophistication in the art improves, however the written 
description would still only be satisfied if those of ordinary skill in the art could see 
that the inventor actually possessed the full scope of the invention that he claimed. 
 283 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350. 
 284 Id. at 1351. 
 285 Id. (citing In re Gosteli, 872 F.3d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 286 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, 
[and] the predictability of the aspect at issue.”
287
 
The court further noted that, while specific examples were not 
always required and that a “constructive reduction to practice that in 
a definite way identifies the claimed invention can satisfy the written 
description,” the specification still must demonstrate possession of 
the invention.
288
  Even if an inventor actually possessed an invention, 
failure to articulate this possession in the specification would prevent 
the patent from satisfying the written description requirement.
289
  The 
written description requirement must satisfy the purpose of 
accurately and specifically disclosing the scope of the claim so that 
there is no confusion as to what the invention is and whether a 
subsequent invention will infringe upon it.  Additionally, the written 
description requirement ensures that those who actually invent an 
invention and have it in their possession are awarded the benefits of 
the patent system.
290
  While Ariad argued that a strict written 
description requirement might hinder basic biotechnology research 
performed at universities, the CAFC pointed out that the balance 
between incentive and reward must be maintained.
291
  Broad, 
preemptive claims on inventions not yet invented would have a 




V. PROMOTING INNOVATION THROUGH ARIAD 
Overbroad patents stifle innovation in the biotechnology 
industry.
293
  The written description requirement can further 
innovation by limiting overbroad patents on a basic level by requiring 
the actual description of a patent to outline the scope and purpose of 
an invention.
294
  Currently, the extent of the impact of the written 
description requirement as articulated in Ariad remains unclear.
295
  By 
placing limits on original claims, however, the written description 
 
 287 Id. (quoting Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 288 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353. For a description of the trade-offs of the patent 
system’s exclusive rights, see supra Part I. 
 291 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353. 
 292 Id. at 1353–54. 
 293 See infra notes 323–41 and accompanying text. 
 294 See infra notes 311–53 and accompanying text. 
 295 See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 109, at 396–97; Holman, supra note 79, at 80–81. 
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requirement could have its largest impact on an inventor’s decision 
whether to patent a claim.
296
  Additionally, the requirement 
encourages inventors to finalize their inventions and pursue an end 
product before seeking patent protection and public disclosure.  
Through these methods, the CAFC’s requirement seems to be a 
positive step towards limiting the problems associated with patents in 
the biotechnology industry. 
Critics of written description argue that the Ariad standard is 
merely an excessive and mutated form of the enablement 
requirement, or a “super enablement” requirement.
297
  As Professor 
Christopher Holman noted in his discussion of Lilly, “[t]he court 
appears to be requiring a precise, nucleotide-by-nucleotide recitation 
of chemical structure . . . while enablement merely requires a 
‘reasonable correlation’ between the scope of disclosure and the 
scope of the claims.”
 298
  Holman argues that to meet the “super 
enablement” requirement, certain biotechnology genus claims must 
include a “structure-based definition” which can only be satisfied by 
describing a ‘“representative number’ of structurally defined 
examples” or by describing “common structural features.”
299
  Holman 
further argues that recent enablement and written description 
jurisprudence shows no indication that there is a meaningful 
distinction between these two doctrines.
300
  Essentially, Holman 
argues that every claim that fails to satisfy the written description 
requirement would also fail to satisfy the enablement requirement.
301
  
Thus, Holman’s primary stance is that the written description 
requirement has not been sufficiently separated from enablement 
since Lilly.
302
  Other studies seem to support Holman’s assertions.
303
 
Overall, the primary arguments against the written description 
requirement are that it is too strict and that it is not sufficiently 
separated from the enablement requirement.
304
  Contrary to Professor 
 
 296 See Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: 
The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 840–41 (2001). 
 297 See Holman, supra note 79, at 17; see also Regents Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 
15–16. 
 298 Holman, supra note 79, at 15. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. at 80. 
 301 Id. at 78. 
 302 Id. at 80; see also Brief for Christopher M. Holman, Inc. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV-11280) [hereinafter Holman Amicus Brief]. 
 303 See Crouch, supra note 109. 
 304 See, e.g., Regents Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 8–10; Holman, supra note 79, at 15. 
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Holman’s assertions, a reasonable distinction between the 
enablement and the written description requirements seems 
apparent: enablement is necessary to ensure that a person of 
reasonable skill in the art can make and use the invention by reading 
the claims, while the written description requirement provides notice 
to the public about what the invention is.  Since the first Patent Act, 
the written description requirement and the enablement 
requirement have stood side-by-side as equally important but separate 
patent provisions.
305
  As innovations in the biotechnology industry 
become increasingly complex, additional detail in patent claims is 
required to outline the scope of an invention.  Otherwise, patents 
that are easily enabled by improving technology but, at the time of 
filing, are not the true scope of the inventor’s actual invention may 
be approved. 
The most recent U.S. Patent Office guidelines highlight how the 
written description requirement is separate from enablement and 
adequately limits the scope of biotechnology inventions.
306
  One 
example in the guidelines discusses a hypothetical claim for “[a]n 
isolated antibody capable of binding to antigen X.”
307
  The guidelines 
note that this claim would satisfy the written description requirement 
even if the antibody were not described; it was essential that the 
antigen would be described in detail.
308
  Because there are only a 
small number of antibodies capable of binding to antigen X and 
because the process to obtain these antibodies is routine, a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would know that the claimant would easily be 
in possession of the antibodies.
309
  This narrow claim appropriately 
includes the inventor’s actual invention and shows that the inventor 
had possession at the time of filing.
310
 
Broad claims, on the other hand, require additional scrutiny.  In 
another example, the USPTO guidelines list two separate written 
descriptions
311
 that relate to a claim for “[a]n isolated nucleic acid 
that encodes a polypeptide with at least 85% amino acid sequence 




 305 See supra notes 1–2, 13–19 and accompanying text. 
 306 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION TRAINING MATERIALS 
(2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf. 
 307 Id. at 45. 
 308 Id. at 45–46. 
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. 
 311 They are labeled “Specification” in the guidelines.  Id. at 37, 39–40. 
 312 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 311, at 37, 40. 
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Specification B includes two specific locations in the sequence that 
account for activity X and conservatively predicts that most mutations 
of the sequence will not impact that activity.
313
  Specification A 
contains no such information.
314
  While both descriptions enable a 
person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the sequence that 
produces activity X,
315
 only specification B indicates that the inventor 
possessed the broad claim of sequences with at least eighty-five 
percent sequence identity that could still produce activity X.
316
  
Specification B removes the chance that an inventor will be awarded 
a broad patent merely on an assumption that similar sequences will 
produce the same function as the disclosed sequence.  As in Ariad, 
the inventor must finalize his invention by disclosing a specific 
correlation between the structure and function of his claims. A broad 
patent should not be granted merely because an inventor lists a few 
examples that will likely result in a desirable function, even if those 
examples are enabling. 
Through Ariad, the CAFC has taken a positive step towards 
negating the problematic overexpansion of patents in the 
biotechnology industry.  By enforcing the written description 
requirement, the CAFC encourages actual invention and stifles broad 
patent claims.  While other recent Federal Circuit restrictions on 
biotechnology patents may directly stifle research the written 
 
 313 Id. at 39–42. 
 314 Id. at 37. 
 315 The inventors would be able to use a computer to identify all the sequences 
that have eighty-five percent sequence identity with the disclosed sequence.  Id. at 38. 
 316 Id. at 39–42.  This example is described in the Ex parte Kubin at the time when 
it was before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.  Ex parte Kubin, 83 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1410 (B.P.A.I. 2007).  In Ex parte Kubin, the patentee claimed a sequence 
that had the function of binding to the protein CD48.  Id. at 1412.  The claim, 
however, was a broad genus claim that included all sequences having “at least 80%” 
sequence identity.  Id. at 1417.  Following Johns Hopkins, the court concluded that 
enablement would have been satisfied because “the amount of experimentation to 
practice the full scope of the claimed invention . . . would have been routine.”  Id. at 
1416 (citing Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)).  The written description requirement, however, was not satisfied because the 
patentee did not disclose sufficient working variations of the claimed sequence that 
could maintain the function of binding to CD48.  Id. at 1417.  The court made its 
conclusion based on prior federal circuit case law, which later led to the en banc 
Ariad decision.  Id. at 1416 (citing Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 
916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Enzo Biochem., Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fiers v. Revel, 
984 F.2d 1164, (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  Notably, the court also rejected the claim under § 
103 for obviousness.  Id. at 1415.  A subsequent federal circuit ruling affirmed the 
obviousness rejection and accordingly did not need to address the written 
description rejection.  In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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description doctrine itself will neither stop nor slow down research at 
universities.
317
  Rather, because the written description requirement 
protects actual invention through full investment over theoretical 
research at its early stages, the industry should be further encouraged 
to invest in both basic research at universities, which can still lead to 
profitable breakthroughs, and in specific products that will actually 
have practical use when released to the public.
318
  Eventually, once 
these products are fully disclosed, further research can be performed 
without concerns about infringement, and the successful patentee 
will have the benefit of his completed invention. 
Restrictions on broad patents and a strict written description 
requirement should lead to more detailed disclosures, appropriately 
awarding actual invention.  When inventions are appropriately 
awarded, investors know that they have a fair chance to earn a return 
on their investment and thus would be encouraged to partner with 
university researchers.  These restrictions, however, can sometimes 
have the opposite effect.  One significant problem is the increasing 
tendency of universities and researchers to withhold disclosure of 
their research until they have completed their inventions.
319
  
Increased funding from pharmaceutical companies can put pressure 
on academic researchers to avoid releasing information that might 
hurt the companies financially.
320
  Academic researchers are 
motivated by a desire to publish their findings.
321
  Accordingly, a 
conflict of interest arises when those researchers are contractually 
obligated to withhold information in order to receive funding from a 
commercial company.
322
  While Ariad does not seem to directly 
address this issue, it promotes innovation by resolving similar 
conflicts that have emerged since the enactment of Bayh-Dole 
between industry and university research. 
 
 317 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09-
Civ.-4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at *147–16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010); Moore, 
supra note 164, at 158–61 (explaining how the CAFC’s restrictions on the 
experimental use doctrine have severely limited its potential and possibly even 
removed its viability altogether). 
 318 See also Michael J. Remington, The Bayh-Dole Act at Twenty-Five Years: Looking 




 319 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY 56 (1998). 
 320 See, e.g., In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 201 F. Supp. 2d 861 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 321 See Witt & Lehnhardt, supra note 193, at 1086. 
 322 Id. 
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Similar conflicts arise when biotechnology companies, seeking a 
return on their investment, refuse to license essential research 
tools.
323
  A recent case involving the biotechnology company Myriad 
Genetics exemplifies potential problems and potential court-offered 
solutions.
324
  In Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, Myriad held crucial patents over certain gene 
sequences that are linked to breast and ovarian cancer.
325
  Myriad’s 
patents also covered any diagnostic or therapeutic use of the genes.
326
  
Due to Myriad’s refusal to license its patents, patients who needed 
genetic sequencing of their tissue samples to screen for the mutations 
were required to send all samples to Myriad.
327
  Screening for the 
mutation is an essential step in detecting and treating the highly 
frequent form of cancer that the mutation causes.
328
  The negative 
 
 323 See Schmieder, supra note 135, at 180–81. 
 324 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09-
Civ-4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at  *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010).  The 
controversy in this case primarily focused on the patentability of isolated DNA 
sequences and not specifically on the written description requirement.  Id. at *3. The 
policy concerns surrounding the case, however, are similar to those presented to the 
biotechnology industry with regard to patent protection.  For a more in depth look 
at the Myriad controversy, see, e.g., Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive 
Control Over Predictive Breast Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent 
Law and Policy: A Case Study of the Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 Food 
Drug L.J. 133 (2004). 
 325 The genes where the mutations are located are called BRCA1 and BRCA2.  Id. 
at *56–57. 
 326 See id.; see also Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2257, 2296 (2010). 
 327 Bernstein, supra note 326, at 2296.   
 328 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at *55–58.  
Discussing the importance of the Myriad screening test, the court noted: 
Women with BRCAl and BRCA2 mutations face up to an 85% 
cumulative risk of breast cancer, as well as up to a 50% cumulative risk 
of ovarian cancer.  In addition, among the 10-15% of ovarian cancer 
cases that are inherited genetically, 80% of women diagnosed under 
the age of 50 carry mutations in their BRCAl genes and 20% carry 
mutations in their BRCA2 genes. . . .  Male carriers of mutations are 
also at an increased risk for breast and prostate cancer. . . .  The 
existence of BRCA1/2 mutations is therefore an important 
consideration in the provision of clinical care for breast and/or ovarian 
cancer. A patient will not only learn of her risk for hereditary breast 
and ovarian cancer, but also can gain information that may be useful in 
determining prevention and treatment options. This information is 
useful for women who are facing difficult decisions regarding whether 
or not to undergo prophylactic surgery, hormonal therapy, 
chemotherapy, and other measures. Testing results for the BRCA1/2 
genes can be an important factor in structuring an appropriate course 
of cancer treatment, since certain forms of chemotherapy can be more 
effective in treating cancers related to BRCA l/2 mutations. 
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consequences of Myriad’s refusal to license were felt by both 
individual patients
329
 and researchers who examine the genes.
330
  The 
latter, unable to perform the screenings independently, were 
restricted in their ability to improve upon the existing technology, 
correct errors by Myriad, or discover additional mutations.
331
  
Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania and the Yale DNA 
Diagnostics Laboratory are two of a number of research institutions 
whom Myriad forced to cease BRCA genetic testing.
332
  In order to 
correct the negative consequences of the Myriad patents, Judge Sweet 
in the Southern District of New York held that patents on genetic 
sequences similar to the Myriad patents are categorically 
unpatentable subject matter under § 101.
333
 
 Judge Sweet’s ruling appears to be a potential solution to 
Myriad’s attempt to hinder further innovation.  But while the 
negative impact to further innovative research, particularly at 
universities, seems apparent in the Association for Molecular Pathology 
case, the reality is far more complex.  Much of Myriad’s research was 
performed in conjunction with universities, primarily the University 
of Utah.
334
  Further, Myriad collaborated with, and received 
significant funding from, the U.S. government for its research.
335
  
Similarly to Ariad, public entities who currently receive little financial 
benefit from patents funded and performed much of the 
groundbreaking research that led to Myriad’s patented gene.
336
  If, 
however, private companies that do not receive significant federal 
support are unable to recover their investments through patent 
protection, the incentive for these companies to invest in high-risk yet 
groundbreaking research like the BRCA project would be greatly 
diminished.
337
  Despite Myriad’s questionable actions, overall research 
 
Id. at *56–57 (internal citations omitted). 
 329 Many patients could not afford the screening test, even if their treatment 
providers had the capability to perform the screening.  Id. at *58–61. 
 330 Id. at *58–61, *75–83. 
 331 Id. at *65.  Some labs even had access to better technology than Myriad and 
could perform “more comprehensive testing than Myriad’s standard testing services.”  
Id. at *66. 
 332 Id. at *61–64. 
 333 Id. at *147–64. 
 334 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at *51–52. 
 335 Id. at *50–54. 
 336 Id. at *53–54.  The federal researchers involved in the BRCA1 research were 
excluded as co-inventors of the BRCA1 patents and Myriad has not paid royalties to 
other parties.  Id. 
 337 Id. at *27. 
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would likely be hindered more than it would be promoted if 
companies like Myriad were to be refused patents for finalized 
inventions. 
Unlike the categorical ban on the genetic sequence patent in 
the Association for Molecular Pathology case under § 101, the Ariad 
decision maintains a better balance between preventing companies 
like Myriad from abusing broad or crucial patents, while at the same 
time allowing investors in biotechnology research to recover their 
investments for finalized products.  The written description 
requirement gives courts the discretion to decide if a broad patent is 
rightfully obtained and actually possessed, or if a claim is merely an 
attempt to predict where research will go in the future and 
prematurely corner the market.
338
  For example, in 2000, Human 
Genome Sciences Incorporated (HGS) was awarded a patent for an 
important gene related to identifying and eventually treating HIV.
339
  
At the time of filing, HGS was unaware of the many functions and the 
general utility of the gene.
340
  To identify the gene, HGS used 
computer analysis to generally predict the utility of the gene and its 
function.
341
  Shortly after HGS received its gene patent, several 
independent researchers demonstrated the actual function of the 
gene as it related to the HIV virus.
342
  Unlike Myriad, however, HGS 
has allowed universities to perform unlicensed research on the gene, 
and is involved in several licensing agreements.
343
  In situations like 
the HGS gene patent where courts—other than the Association for 
Molecular Pathology court—have been unwilling to use § 101 to limit 
broad predictive biotechnology patents,
344
 the written description 
requirement may provide a solution.  A court could look to a broad 
claim for a multi-functioning gene and use the written description 
requirement to appropriately limit the scope of the patent or 
invalidate it altogether upon a finding that the patentee did not truly 
posses the actual invention that he is claiming.  The written 
description requirement curbs abuse of the patent system while 
 
 338 See supra notes 278–99 and accompanying text. 
 339 See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences 
in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a 
Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1661–62 (2001). 
 340 Id. at 1625–26. 
 341 Id. at 1625 n.11. 
 342 Id. at 1625–26.  Additional functions were also later identified.  Id. 
 343 Richard Li-dar, Biomedical Upstream Patenting Scientific Research: The Case for 
Compulsory Licensing Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 251, 273 
(2008). 
 344 See Gitter, supra note 339, at 1662; Wang, supra note 343, at 272–73. 
JAKAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  4:51 PM 
1332 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1287 
avoiding categorical bans on biotechnology patents that are essential 
to promoting further private-public collaboration and future 
innovation. 
In addition, even if the written description requirement furthers 
the incentive for universities to withhold research for their corporate 
investor until the research is completed (and it seems unclear if this 
is a significant problem at all), the end result includes a finalized 
product by the researchers and increased confidence for investors.  It 
would be much more problematic to grant broad patents 
prematurely to universities that are neither tied to industry nor 
supported by adequate funding, who then might refuse to license 
essential research technologies.
345
  Such a policy would greatly lower 
the industry’s incentive to continue funding research at universities 
or other research institutions.  A possible middle ground may involve 
allowing entities like Ariad to somehow share in the rewards of the 
finalized product that results from the groundbreaking discovery.
346
  
The written description requirement could accomplish this goal by 
encouraging researchers to develop narrower patents that they can 
license for more reasonable fees, as opposed to the excessive charges 
that can result from broad patents that corner too much of the 
market.  Lowering overall costs should encourage greater investment 
and provide further opportunity for public-private collaboration. 
The intent of the Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts is to 
encourage innovation through public-private collaboration, primarily 
by tapping into university research.
347
  If the system focuses too greatly 
on obtaining patents for profit and less on promoting cooperative 
research, innovation will be stifled.  Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 
researchers at federally funded universities continue to have an 
obligation to disclose their work.
348
  Knowing of this disclosure 
obligation, the biotechnology industry has continued to invest in 
university research, and technology transfer at universities also 
continues to grow.
349
  Even with potential conflicts between the 
entities, universities and the biotechnology industry are still 
 
 345 See Schmieder, supra note 135, at 180–81. 
 346 See, e.g., Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samardzija, Compulsory Patent Licensing: 
Is it a Viable Solution in the United States?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 509 
(2007); Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case for 
a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOWARD L.J. 579 (2005). 
 347 See supra notes 151–83 and accompanying text. 
 348 See Witt & Lehnhardt, supra note 193, at 1082. 
 349 See, e.g., Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 2 SCIENCE 
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 52, Oct. 6, 2010, available at 
http://stm.sciencemag.org/content/2/52/52cm27.full.pdf. 
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interdependent
350
 when it comes to biotechnology research.
351
  The 
written description requirement articulated in Ariad shows the CAFC 
is aware of the negative incentives associated with overbroad patents, 
particularly those for DNA.
352
  Granting overbroad patents for 
unidentified DNA sequences, particularly those whose function may 
vary greatly, would hinder innovation.  As in the Ariad case, 
companies like Ariad would be able to prevent others from 
completing the necessary research to develop an actual product for 
the described concept. 
The relationship between the three major players in the 
development of biotechnology—the government, the private 
industry, and the universities—has been described as “antagonistic” 
and at the same time “cooperative and even symbiotic.”
353
  For this 
reason, maintaining a balance between encouraging basic research 
and promoting patent protection to recoup profits is a difficult task.
354
  
If universities obtain more power to protect their broad basic 
research, there will be fewer opportunities for private industries to 
invest.  Accordingly, there would be a negative impact on universities 
if they were to oppose the interests of the pharmaceutical industry to 
develop finalized workable products.  Further, public funding and 
the academic researchers’ desire to advance in their field preserve 
the potential to develop breakthrough products.
355
  Similarly, 
groundbreaking discoveries will always provide universities with 
reputational benefits, which draws additional investors, students, and 
distinguished faculty members.
356
  While Congress designed the Bayh-
Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts to give researchers further incentive to 
perform high-risk biotechnology research, the benefits presented 
 
 350 Research universities rely on investment and funding to support further 
academic research, while the biotechnology industry relies on the manpower and 
risk management of universities to complete complex research projects.  Brief for the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization and the Association of University Technology 
Managers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24248 at *24–26 (Fed. 
Cir. Filed Nov. 23, 2010) (No. 2010-1406). 
 351 Id. 
 352 See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349–53 (noting that 
Ariad illustrates the problems associated with generic claims, particularly those in the 
“biological arts,” and how these broad patents, merely by describing a function, cover 
compounds that are only later “actually invented” through the subsequent work of 
the pharmaceutical industry); Id. at 1358–59 (Newman, J., concurring).  
 353 See Golden, supra note 153, at 131. 
 354 Id. at 135–36. 
 355 Id. at 148–51. 
 356 Madley v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (2002). 
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To that end, the Ariad decision is a step in the right direction to 
fix some of the imbalances arising from the current trends in the 
biotechnology industry and biotechnology patents.  Disclosure 
continues to be an essential requirement of university-funded 
research,
358
 and the written description requirement in Ariad requires 
a specific disclosure of the patented invention.
359
  A specific DNA 
sequence, even slightly altered, may have a significantly different 
function than the claimed invention.
360
  A specific description both 
encourages streamlined research into useful products and 
discourages inventors who might attempt to game the system by 
teaching others to make something that the inventor did not yet 
possess.  Accordingly, the written description requirement articulated 
in Ariad gives judges another method to police abuses and promote 
innovation of the patent system by basic researchers, particularly in 
biotechnology where patents are so essential to future research. 
Ariad merely solidifies the proposition that only those who make 
meaningful contributions to the useful arts should obtain patents.  
There is little to suggest that university researchers will avoid 
performing research if they are restricted to patents on products that 
they actually invented instead of receiving broad genus patents that 
may cover discoveries that they have not yet made.
361
  If a patent is 
worthy of a genus claim, it should be granted the rights to that 
invention and all the benefits that come with it.  Because universities 
have additional legal protection, continue to receive public and 
private funding, and receive broad discretion with the use of those 
funds, there is nothing to indicate that they may not allocate those 
funds to additional research that will lead to breakthrough 
discoveries and the spoils of that research.
362
  Because academic 
researchers are motivated by financial and personal incentives, a 
better incentive for research is to allow both motivating factors, the 




 357 See Moore, supra note 164, at 153. 
 358 See supra notes 182, 319–30 and accompanying text. 
 359 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 360 See Holman Amicus Brief, supra note 79, at 12. 
 361 See generally Regents Amicus Brief, supra note 4 (discussing the major benefits 
granted by Bayh-Dole yet failing to note setbacks since the application of the written 
description requirement as articulated in Ariad). 
 362 See Rowe, supra note 26, at 301–09. 
 363 See Golden, supra note 153, at 153–54. 
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restrictions on patents like the written description requirement 
articulated in Ariad, the ability for researchers to innovate would be 
severely restricted by the constant threat of infringement and the 
over-patenting of inventions not yet invented. 
Further, due to the nature of the biotechnology industry, where 
there is uncertainty today there is unlikely to be uncertainty 
tomorrow.  As the biotechnology industry improves, it should become 
easier for researchers to disclose the number of species that they 
actually invented, thus allowing legitimate genus claims.  The level of 
technology, however, is not the focus of the written description 
requirement.  The written description simply looks to the breadth of 
the claims and determines whether the claimed scope is what the 
inventor possessed on the day he filed for a patent application.  The 
requirement places less emphasis on what others could accomplish 
based on the inventor’s claims (an expansive enablement approach) 
but places more pressure on the inventor to fully articulate the 
boundaries of the invention (a limiting approach).  At the same time, 
inventors are encouraged to provide more detailed disclosure, 
rewarding the public with more information that other researchers 
can use for further innovation.  Accordingly, with fewer restrictive 
patents issued and more specific disclosures from university 
researchers, more opportunities for investment should become 
available. This will foster further public-private collaboration.  Far 
from discouraging the congressional motivations for Bayh-Dole and 
Hatch-Waxman, the written description requirement should only 
encourage researchers to fully develop techniques that identify 
potentially useful products and mechanisms and to not simply look 
for an easy way to obtain overreaching patent rights. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
After Ariad, there undoubtedly is a distinct and separate written 
description requirement in U.S. patent law under 35 U.S.C. § 112.  
The overall impact of the written description requirement to modern 
technology, however, is unclear thus far.  Regardless, Ariad as a whole 
reasserted the notion that to gain the benefit of the exclusive rights 
of a patent, an inventor is obligated to specifically describe the 
invention that was actually invented.  This not only maintains the 
quid pro quo of the patent monopoly but also notifies members of 
the public of the scope of the invention so that they can avoid 
infringement.  An inventor should only receive a broad patent if the 
inventor can show that he made the broad discovery and not just a 
small fraction of what he allegedly claims.  The written description 
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requirement is an essential tool in preventing inventors from abusing 
the patent system by claiming more than they have a right to claim. 
The patent system rewards those who perform their due 
diligence and actually contribute to the useful arts.  In the 
biotechnology industry, with high risk comes high reward.  Through 
public funding, special protections, and out-of-market motivations, 
universities are in a unique position to bear the high risk associated 
with developing novel biotechnology products.  Congress 
acknowledged the need to support such entities by passing the Bayh-
Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts.  These Acts sought to promote and 
continue to promote innovation, particularly in the biotechnology 
industry.  While these Acts have had a positive impact on innovation, 
the complexity of the technology and the rate at which the 
technology has advanced make it difficult for the patent system to 
keep pace.  Blocking technologies and excessive costs for licensing 
are just two of the major problems that arose out of a system that was 
unable to adequately comprehend the scope and significance of 
particular inventions. 
Ariad and the written description requirement further the intent 
of the Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts to promote innovation and 
encourage cooperation between public and private actors.  By 
rewarding actual invention, the Federal Circuit further encourages 
the symbiotic relationship between the biotechnology industry and 
universities.  Even though some commentators criticize the written 
description requirement for being a mere extension of enablement 
and for having a negligible impact, Ariad has greater significance for 
the policies that the requirement advances and its more targeted 
inquiry.  The written description requirement in Ariad avoids an 
inquiry into what others can accomplish based on a disclosure, and 
instead encourages an inventor to set the specific boundaries of his 
actual invention.  For an unpredictable field like biotechnology, it is 
important to emphasize limitations as opposed to allowing inventors 
to advantageously use unpredictability to claim more than they are 
entitled to.  Patents reward invention.  Innovation is to be 
encouraged and not stifled.  The detail that the written description 
requirement mandates not only informs other inventors of the 
claimed invention so that they can innovate further but also provides 
the proper incentive to those who work to create a truly useful 
technology. 
 
